Amid the current turmoil, one of the most urgent topics being discussed in Armenia, outside the incumbent government circles, is Artsakh, depopulated of its indigenous Armenian inhabitants. Has the issue of Artsakh been closed once and for all, resulting in the permanent loss of part of our homeland, or is there still hope of turning the tables by reversing Armenia's unfavorable developments? Strangely, signs pointing to the latter, no matter how weird it may sound, come involuntarily from Azerbaijan, especially from President Ilham Aliyev himself.

Aliyev frequently exhibits convulsive demands for Armenia to change its constitution, ordering the destruction of Artsakh's cities and villages, its historical and cultural monuments, and even its Armenian cemeteries, hoping to prevent any Armenian return. It seems the vision of Artsakh's rightful inhabitants coming back deeply unsettles him, revealing his inner fears. In short, "a thief can't hide his guilty feeling." However, given his country’s stable position—secured by legislative, contractual, and economic bases, hydrocarbon supplies, and strong allies—he has little apparent reason for such fears.

It should be noted that on June 15, 2021, during a visit to the occupied city of Shushi, Turkish President Erdogan signed the Shushi Declaration with his Azerbaijani counterpart Aliyev, reinforcing “allied relations” between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This declaration outlined cooperation across political, economic, cultural, and energy sectors, the Southern Gas Corridor, defense industry, military cooperation and mutual military assistance. Prior to this, on February 22, 2020, literally two days before the Russian-Ukrainian war, Aliyev and Russian President Putin signed a strategic alliance agreement in Moscow, vowing to upgrade their bilateral relations to an allied level. The 43-article document promotes their cooperation in a wide range of areas, from humanitarian and economic ties to coordination in critical security issues. Additionally, Baku has signed agreements with Iran and Caspian region countries.

For the foreseeable future, Armenia poses no significant military, economic, or demographic threat to Azerbaijan, especially under Nikol Pashinyan’s leadership. Furthermore, Azerbaijan's role on the international stage is poised to grow as it increases gas exports to Europe, with Russia expected to withdraw from the European blue fuel market by January 2025. How, then, can we explain the incomprehensible behavior and occasional outbursts of Azerbaijan's leader?

To answer this, we must first consider what happened in September 2020: why the 44-day war broke out, how it was lost, and to whom. Armenia lost not merely to Azerbaijan but to Israel, whose weapons proved decisive; to Britain, which provided diplomatic support and intelligence; to Turkey, whose role and motives were clear; to Pakistan and terrorists brought from Syria; and ultimately, to the United States, which opted to stand aside. "Armenians are smart people, they are good people; they will figure something out," said former U.S. President Donald Trump.

The 2020 war was, in essence, prearranged. This fact was inadvertently revealed by Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, who specified the war’s main direction, date, and time in advance. Here lies the key to Aliyev's irritability and apparent mental unrest. He knows he did not truly win the war—it was handed to him. He knows such favorable circumstances may not come again. He knows he has gone too far, carrying out ethnic cleansing in the thousand-year-old lands of Artsakh and appropriating Armenian territories. And he knows the time for accountability for the crimes will come.

Aliyev fears changes in international relations, the prospect of a power shift in Armenia, Armenian revanchism, the return of Artsakh, rightful compensation, and perhaps even his own shadow.