History doesn't like ifs. However, it would be interesting to observe the results of the April events, if the constitutional referendum did not take place in 2015, and the semi-presidential form of government remained the same. In this case, the revolutionary masses would have to clarify their demand, that is, to try either the resignation of the president, the dissolution of parliament or the resignation of the government. The simultaneous demand for the resignation of state institutions would be unrealistic and virtually impossible. It would rather mean the requirements of the collapse of the state.

If the government, for example, would succumb to the powerful onslaught of people, one or two of the “counter-revolutionary” branches of government would have to continue their functions, and the “revolutionaries” would have to deal with “counter-revolutionaries” and adapt. It is clear that the former management system was not “adapted” to revolutions.

In the new Constitution, as experience has shown, this was possible. The parliamentary majority “surrendered” to the people, and at the next stage it is forced to sacrifice itself as a result of a complex combination. Everything leads to this.

In fact, the new Constitution can be called a “revolutionary Constitution.” However, the revolutionary potential of the existing Basic Law is not exhausted: it contains the possibilities of new revolutions, coups, revolutionary upheavals, which is worth discussing in order to understand what plausible scenarios we could observe.

The new government is the result of revolutionary euphoria, and the new parliament also has revolutionary expectations. Such elections cannot be rational, especially if one considers the fact that the political field is collapsing and the term “party” is discredited. This is the result of the behavior of parties over the past twenty years. As a result, we have what we have.

With any government scandal, this euphoria will diminish, and serious mistakes and lack of expectations can lead the masses against their former idols. In this case, we need to revert to our new "revolutionary" Constitution. The role of deputies is growing in the light of the absence of a presidential institution with big levers. In case of public dissatisfaction, each government is insured from resigning only for a year (according to the Constitution, the parliament has no right to express a vote of no confidence in the government during the first year). Because of the possible political and social upheavals that we face, governments seem to be defenseless, because these institutions are the first responsible for such situations.

The question of changing the Constitution becomes urgent again.